

Characterising global risk profiles of Mpox clade Ib importation

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
長崎大学
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17 October 2024
Mpox Community Call
WHO Collaboratory

Context of our analysis – In early September

Country	Cumulative confirmed cases Jan-Aug 2024
DRC	4799
- South Kivu	1370
Burundi	328
Uganda	10
Rwanda	4
Kenya	2
Sweden	1
Thailand	1

MPXV clades detected in Africa
from 1 Jan 2022, as of 08 Sep 2024



Travel history – among African countries

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DRC	4799
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5 did not have travel history to Mpox affected countries

All four cases had travel history to DRC/Burundi

Patient 1: Travel history from Kampala, Uganda, to Mombasa, Kenya at the time of identification, the patient was travelling to Rwanda through Tanzania.

Patient 2: Long-distance truck driver to DRC

Complicated travel history – outside Africa

As of September,

No	Country	Confirmation date	Age, sex, nationality	Travel history
1	Sweden	2024-08-15	Aged between 30-40 years	Travelled to Sweden from an outbreak-affected country in the African region. The travel itinerary included more than one transit and some longer stopovers.
2	Thailand	2024-08-22	66-year-old European man	Arrived in Bangkok from unnamed African country on 14 August.
3	India	2024-09-23	38-year-old man	Landed in Kerala, India from the UAE


We expect more importations in the future,

-> Characterise global risk profiles and compare that risk with the observations

Study setting

Study setting

- Clade Ib of MPXV was assumed to be exported from
 - DRC (main analysis)
 - DRC or Burundi
 - DRC, Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya
- and imported
 - through flight routes
 - to countries except ones reporting clade Ia or Ib




Operational mpox HCID (Clade I) case definition,
<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/operational-mpox-monkeypox-hcid-case-definition>


Data

IATA flight volume data averaged over May 2023 to June 2024

Note: No use of incidence data




Method




$$\underline{D_i} \sim \text{Geom}(r_i)$$


Number of imported cases globally before country i observed an importation.

Method





(B) Simulated total number of importations before a specific country observed one importation




(C) Simulated number of countries with importations before a specific country observed one importation

Sweden – 36th [95% range: 3-74th] country to import clade Ib

Thailand – 47th [95% range: 6-88th] country to import clade Ib

-> Statistically, those two were not among countries most likely to report 1st and 2nd importations (same conclusions from the sens. ana.)



(C) Simulated number of countries with importations before a specific country observed one importation

Interpretation and conclusion

Explanation for early Sweden and Thailand importations would be

- Potential underreporting in high-risk countries.
 - First few importations in countries with the largest travel volume may have been missed? e.g. South Africa, France, Belgium, etc...
 - Deletion of target domain affected PCR test accuracy for clade differentiation.
- Model limitations
 - Complicated travel histories might not be captured by flight data.

Conclusion

- Highlighted the need to ramp up surveillance capacity for early detection.
- Our results showed the likely phase at which a country may experience importations (e.g. India and UAE are likely to report importations early from our results)

Thank you



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